


Pearson Edexcel

A Level History



Summer 2017 examination series
STUDENT ANSWERS PAPER 9HI0_01

Exemplar Pack 3 – Option 1E

GCE History 2015

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About this exemplars pack

This pack has been produced to support History teachers delivering the new A Level History specification (first teaching 2015). Existing exemplar packs for both AS and A Level can be found on the Edexcel website and further packs will be published as centres progress through the course.

The pack contains exemplar student responses to A Level History Paper 1:

- 1E: Russia, 1917-91: from Lenin to Yeltsin.

It shows real student responses to questions from the Summer 2017 examination series. The questions covered in this pack address Assessment Objectives 1 and 3.

Students must:		% in GCE
AO1	Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance	55
AO2	Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context	20
AO3	Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted	25
Total		100%

Following each question, you will find the mark scheme for the band that the student has achieved.

Paper 9H10_1E

Section A

Question 1 and Question 2

EITHER

- 1 How accurate is it to say that the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different?

OR

- 2 How far do you agree that the benefits of Stalin's economic policies outweighed the costs in the years 1928–50?

Exemplar response A

Chosen question number: **Question 1** ☒ **Question 2** ☒

The nature of government under ^{Lenin} Stalin and Stalin in some respects can be regarded as the same. The main goal of the Bolshevik party was to have state control, and this was effectively continued under Stalin. This said on the other hand it can be said that the nature of government differed widely, when considering how the two leaders came into power. This said other aspects of the government like the use of terror can be seen to have continued, however some historians would argue that Stalin used terror to a greater extent compared to Lenin. Overall to say that the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was markedly different can be regarded to be a false statement, as it did stay relatively the same. One way in which the nature of government was markedly different was the

(Section A continued) leaders way of getting into the government and how this affected their position. Ultimately Lenin achieved power after the fall of the Tsar. This said a central committee was set-up in order to make the system more democratic. This said under this ~~the~~ ~~BO~~ system the Bolsheviks did not get the majority of the votes. Therefore as a result after only 1 meeting with the central committee Lenin dissolved it, establishing his own authoritarian dictatorship. As a result he banned all other factions such as the Workers party. On the other hand Stalin eliminated his opponents at the very start. His main opponent was Trotsky who can be considered to be Trotsky's Lenin's favoured successor. To 'eliminate' him Stalin ensured that Lenin's testament was not read out, ~~in~~ in which Lenin commended Trotsky. Furthermore he ensured that Trotsky did not attend Lenin's funeral, in doing so giving Trotsky a bad image. In a last att-

(Section A continued) ~~empt~~ to eliminate him, Stalin removed him from his position as commissar of War. Overall all of these actions mean't that Trotsky had lost his previous support and power. Stalin then went on to eliminate his rivals Kamanov and Zinoviev, who were strongly left. He distined the two as they were critical of his growing power. Therefore he blamed them for the murder of Kirov, at the trial of 16 in which they were denounced from their positions. Once denounced Stalin filled their positions with his cronies. He then went on to remove his opposition on the right this consisted of Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov. ~~la remove~~ He removed them as the were critical of grain requisitioning and felt that the NEP should have continued. During the grain crisis 1927 Bukharin strongly criticised Stalin. Therefore as a result Stalin removed them from their positions. When considering all of this it can be said that the nature of government was markedly different in terms of how the

(Section A continued) Two obtained their power in government. However both leaders did remove any opposition, therefore perhaps it wasn't can be considered to have stayed relatively the same.

Under Lenin there was the Civil War against the Whites and the Reds, therefore to aid this 'battle' he set up War Communism. This economic plan focused on the centralisation of politics, economy and military. However it was very unpopular amongst the peasants and caused great famine. So as a result in 1921 at the 10th party congress Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP). This policy was a compromise between capitalism. This policy arguably did save agriculture as it did allow for growth. However it did leave the party divided. The left felt as if it was bringing back capitalist corruption whereas the right felt as if it was necessary to ensure stability. As a result when Stalin came into power he got rid of the NEP and introduced

(Section A continued) the first five year plan and collectivisation. The first five year plans focus was on heavy industry and quantity not quality. Collectivisation required farmers to pool land and tools. This was unpopular amongst the peasants and in retaliation they slaughtered their animals, 17 million horses for example. In some sense this change of economic planning can be seen as a markedly different nature of government. However it is unsure as to whether or not the NEP was only a temporary measure put ~~made~~ in place by Lenin. Overall there is a clear change in the nature of government in terms of running the economy, however it is perhaps still a continuation of what Lenin did.

Lastly the terror used by the government has to be recognised. Under Lenin he set up the ~~the~~ Red Guards and Cheka to deal with counter-revolutionaries. This use of terror can be seen in the riots in the region of Tambov over War Communism. Over 50,000 individuals

(Section A continued) rebelled so Lenin sent the Red Guard to stop this. During the NEP Lenin utilised the Red Guard to crush NEPmen (rich traders), as the government considered them to be parasites. On the other hand Stalin used terror to a much greater extent. In 1938 he had a 'chistka', cleaning of the party. Where he set quotas to remove members he felt were going against him, as a result 20% of the party was removed. Furthermore he overall used terror to frighten his opponents. In the whole it can be said that the use of terror under the government was not widely different, however Stalin did use it to a greater extent.

In conclusion, the nature of government under Lenin and Stalin was not markedly different. Both leaders used terror and removed any opponents in the government - This said it can be argued that the nature of economy was markedly different. Overall it can be said that Stalin used Lenins gover-

(Section A continued) *ment as a blueprint for his own.*

This response received 7 marks.

2	4-7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
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Exemplar response B

Chosen question number: **Question 1** ☒ **Question 2** ☒

2) Stalin's economic policies in the years 1928-50 came with considerable costs and benefits to the USSR. These policies included the implementation of 5-year Plans, - which were moving away from the New Economic Policy, and also changes to the market-led economy and state capitalism that had been under Lenin. The cost of the policies were the impact ^{they had} on the Soviet people themselves, such as lack of goods - but ^{all of the public were in} ~~not~~ employment. //

The majority of Stalin's economic policies were the introduction of the 5-year Plans. These aimed to increase productivity and socialism in one country by making the USSR self-controlled, ^{and not reliant on others.} The first 5-year Plan focused on the increase of heavy industry such as coal and steel and neglected consumer goods dramatically. The production of coal saw an increase from 36 million tonnes to 130 million during this period. The growth in steel production was also considerable, and benefited Stalin's drive for industrialisation. Under the first 5-year Plan however, the lack of consumer goods began to rise - which would have further impacts in the second plan. This policy was good at providing employment

(Section A continued) throughout the USSR as there was high demand for workers and labour. However, the targets that were set by Gosplan were far too ambitious and practically unachievable. It led to a growth in corruption, but this was able to be smoothed out in this plan - and it meant that it made it look far more prosperous than it was. The false sense of hope this policy provided had a huge negative impact on the Soviet people, not despite the fact that physically there were some improvements in Russia, it was not in fact a true representation of the situation at all.

This deception and corruption also continued in the second 5-year Plan, which once again focused on heavy industry and not consumer goods. ~~At that~~ Quantity was heavily favoured over quality by Stalin, showing that figures to the outside world were more important to him than his own economy's future or its people. Corruption remained a key problem, and was beginning to be felt by the Soviet people at this point. The USSR were also not meeting its chemical or natural gas targets, and it was very quickly beginning to become out of date with the rest of the world. This policy did not bring enough benefits to outweigh the cost, as the small benefits that were felt in the first plan could not even be matched. Therefore, the declining production levels put in place by Gosplan were proving to have an

(Section A continued) even larger consequence than before.

Stalin also made changes to the economy by ~~altering~~ removing many of the previous features which had been part of the NEP. Stalin originally wanted to see a continuation of the NEP, but then changed course and implemented the many 5-year plans. Workers had far less power than they previously had, bartering was removed and currency once again introduced. A key feature was having a centralised Economy that was run by government and Gosplan, and ~~the~~ Venzpos controlled supplies to different industries also. The lack of consumer goods at this time was detrimental to the economy as there was no incentive for the workers to work hard, as there was nothing to buy in the shops. When consumer goods were made however, they were of very poor quality and were not what the consumer even wanted. Having a Command Economy under Stalin, meant that there was little change on what was set to be produced, and there was very high levels of inefficiency and waste. This level of waste meant that there was a very high cost to the policies as the gain that was truly being felt was very small.

Stalin's introduction of industrial towns and centers however, provided a boost to the USSR's economy. The development of towns such as

(Section A continued) magnitogorsk under the first 5-yr plan were a huge asset to increasing production levels. The population of Magnitogorsk also grew substantially, from 25 to 25000 - and the growth of the population and employment was readily welcomed. The USSR was producing goods that were unwanted, poorly made and out-of-date, but heavy industry was still growing under Stalin. The benefits from Stalin's economic policies was that people had jobs - even though they were monotonous and poor quality, they were employed.

Having such ambitious targets to meet did not inspire workers in the way Stalin hoped it would, and his lack of awareness and control over developments in the economy meant that there were very few benefits from his policies. The policies & benefits did not outweigh the cost in the years 1928-50, for the people, state or government. The lack of ^{true} knowledge of what was happening weakened the party and the people had no true gain from any of the policies. The movement away from state capitalism and lend-lease under Lenin was crucial for Stalin to truly create communism within the USSR, however the changes enforced had far more negative consequences than benefits for the USSR.

In conclusion, the cost of moral and wasted

(Section A continued) products heavily outweighed the small level of benefits that came from having Stalin's economic policies in place. The economic situation created here during Stalin's control over the party tickled down and resulted in a total stagnation of economic policies by the end of the Soviet era.

This response received 11 marks.

3	8–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
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Exemplar response C

Chosen question number: Question 1 ☒ Question 2 ☒

Between the years 1928–1950, Stalin managed to transform the Russian economy from a backwards agricultural economy with 80% of the population being made up of peasants, to a nuclear superpower. However, this came at the ~~cost~~ human cost of 20 million lives. So, if we judge 'costs' in the number of human lives lost, then ~~the~~ Stalin economic policies were not worth the benefits. However, his economic policy brought ~~the~~ the USSR into the 20th century, meaning they could defeat Nazi Germany's world war 2, perhaps saving more lives than it cost.

(Section A continued)

In 1928, when Stalin came to power, the Soviet economy was backwards, with 5 million wooden ploughs still in use. By 1950, however, the USSR had defeated the then European hegemon; Germany. The first 5 year plan (~~1928~~ 1928-1932) focused on building up industry. By 1932, Magnitogorsk had gone from a non-descript settlement of 25 people to a steel superpower of 250,000 people. ~~Similarly~~ This meant that by the ~~end of the~~ time the USSR went to war in 1941, steel production had increased 5 fold, as well as electricity increasing 10 fold. ~~Th~~ Thousands of tanks and ammunition were made here during the war, meaning that the Soviet Union could defeat the battle hardened Germans, despite Stalin's purging of the army in the mid 1930s. This must've saved many lives, as ~~if~~ the USSR would've been annihilated had Hitler won the war. Therefore, Stalin's economic policy

(Section A continued) benefitted the USSR more than it cost, in terms of ~~storing~~ the scourge of war. Stalin himself said in 1941 that without this rapid industrialisation, the USSR would "be crushed".

However, there was a huge human ~~and cultural~~ cost. An example of this can be seen in the 1932 construction of the White Sea-Baltic canal. Of the 250,000 gulag prisoners who worked on it, 16,000 died. The canal was too shallow to be of use and froze solid half the year. There was no benefit to this huge loss of life, and this type of waste points us to the conclusion that ^{the costs of} Stalin's ruthless economic policy were not outweighed by the benefits of ~~the~~ industrialisation as more people died than had to to fulfill his economic aims.

Similarly, the 1929 Dekulakisation campaign shows that Stalin's ruthless policy caused more devastation than

(Section A continued) economic gain. An estimated 1-2 million of the most experienced farmers were killed or arrested during Stalin's vicious campaign against kulaks as a class. This was in retaliation to the 1928 grain procurement crisis, ~~to~~ however Stalin's economic policy of killing the best farmers in retaliation was more of a personal attack than a pragmatic economic policy. It, in part, led to the man made famine which killed about 10-12 million - particularly in the most fertile areas of the Ukraine. The cost of this, both in terms of the destruction of agriculture and in terms of human life, vastly outweighed any benefits. The peasants only started to recover and produce grain which surpassed 1913 levels after Stalin's death in 1953. His agricultural economic policy was more vicious than pragmatic. It destroyed the peasantry with ~~little~~ ^{little} benefit.

However, it has to be said that

(Section A continued) this style of ruthlessly centralised economic policy did bring benefits to the USSR. Because the economy was not run on demand and supply, but on quotas, factories ~~and~~ could not afford to be complacent. When Stalin wanted more steel, more steel was produced. This was shown in the 4th 5 year plan after World war 2. Despite the ~~country's~~ ^{nation's} state of ruin, the ~~the~~ level of industrial output rose by 80% between 1945 and 1950. The Soviet Union was producing nuclear weapons. This could not have happened as quickly if the market was left to recover at its own pace. Therefore, despite the huge costs of Stalin's economic policy, ~~that's~~ it allowed Russia to power ahead with 7.5% growth per annum ~~despite~~ despite the state of the nation and its people.

However, Stalin's economy was only set up for heavy industry - which, although,

* and technology

(Section A continued) he was very successful in this area, did not benefit workers who were living in shared apartments. Consumer goods were severely neglected during 1928-1950. Although there was some attempt to make shoes and ice-cream in the second five year plan, this was quickly abandoned in 1937 as war approached. The result of this was a military-industrial economy and a severe deficit of consumer goods*. This caused huge problems for the successive leaders as the Soviet economy fell far behind the west. There was ~~not~~ no incentive to be productive, other than to avoid being arrested, ~~knowing~~ as there was nothing to buy. The economy was severely asymmetric by 1950, however it may be true that this^e was due to world war 2 which ~~accent~~ accentuated the importance of industry. The result was, however, an old fashioned industrial-revolution style economy which held back

(Section A continued) the USSR until its fall in 1991.

~~for finally, however~~

To conclude ~~however~~, I think that the human costs of Stalin's economic policy from 1928 to 1950 was higher than the benefits. Although it was important to rapidly industrialise the backwards economy in order to win the war, Stalin could have achieved this without wasting as the human lives he did. Therefore, despite the benefits of his economic policy, the unnecessary costs made it a failure and thus the costs outweigh the benefits.

This response received 20 marks.

5	17-20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.
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Section B

Question 3 and Question 4

EITHER

- 3 How accurate is it to say that the status of women was transformed under Soviet rule in the years 1917-85?

OR

- 4 How significant was the role of the secret police in maintaining communist control in the years 1917-85?

Exemplar response D

Chosen question number: Question 3 ☒ Question 4 ☒

The emancipation ~~test~~ of women had been a common goal for many before the 1917 revolution, when the Bolsheviks took power Lenin declared men and women were equal in legal footing, and changes were implemented.

However, different leaders had different ideas and the improvement of status was not constant. It was perceived differently in countryside to the cities and the attitudes of many were slow to change, there is no doubt there was improvement but not ~~the~~ complete transformation.

Lenin gave women the vote in 1917 as men and women now equal in legal status, improving their position. However, they were underrepresented in the party with the only ^{female} ~~Communist~~ being Alexandra Kollontai from 1918-1919. It gave women a ~~voice~~ choice but no clear voice. With Lenin's introduction of the marriage law in 1918, divorce made easier and abortion legalised, this gave women improved status as they could free themselves ~~from~~ from the burden

(Section B continued) of children and free themselves from abusive relationships. However, this did not help women with children as many ^{70%} of ~~the~~ divorce requests came from men who had got their wives pregnant. Showing that the ^{intention} ~~decision~~ was clear but ~~that~~ it did not actually help improve the status of women. Overall, women's legal status had improved under Lenin but despite Zhenskdel and Alexandra Kollontai, women's status could not be improved if they were not represented enough. The marriage had the right intentions but back fired to leave a large percentage of women single mothers.

~~It just didn't~~ continued with Lenin's policies, but when birth rate was falling it worried him. This led to the Great Retreat of 1926,

1927, came with the attempt to increase party control of outlying regions by attempts to better lives of Islamic women who were often shielded from public and denied an education. The 1927 campaign of unveiling led to some success, but other women were drowned by families and even killed. Showing that the emancipation of women ^{and improvement of status} could not benefit all. The result of this and falling birth rate

(Section B continued) led to Stalin into the 'Great retreat of 1936', where divorce ~~was~~ ^{wasn't} in ~~order~~ from 4 to ~~50~~ ⁵⁰ rubles and a tax on single people were introduced, this left women trapped in abusive relationships or forced into one they did not want to be, banning abortion again meant women could not advance their career but resorted to bringing up children. It was not until 1941 ~~of~~ and world war II that the status of women began to improve again, women played in army with 89 winning highest military award as well as gaining jobs in factories. However, women only needed in army after the loss of men and many in nursing roles, ~~before~~ women who had jobs were likely to lose them to men after war, ~~but~~ but, the line between 'men's work' and 'women's work' had been blurred. Stalin's retreat did little to improve the status of women and people's attitudes were slow to change meaning men remained dominant in both cities and countryside.

Khrushchev helped improve ~~ed~~ status of women through education, but expelling them

(Section B continued) To look after children and hold down a job was unrealistic. ~~Through~~ Through ~~education~~ growth of higher education under Khrushchev many women could go to university as more places were reserved for them, meaning they could join the party and improve their status, but this was only a reality for women in towns, as those in countryside had a more entrenched approach to women and education, meaning the improvement in status of women had a greater impact in cities. ~~that~~ Khrushchev also freed up women from burden of childcare through re-regulation of abortions that allowed women to pursue improvement of life through greater education and ~~use~~ jobs. However, Brezhnev reversed this meaning women were only helped for a short while. ~~However~~ On the other hand, Brezhnev enforced that men should pay for children which helped women but did not do much to improve their status.

Overall, women had greater availability of jobs to improve their status in society and were often free from above relations with no choice of whether to have a baby or not. However,

(Section B continued) The frequent review of policies did not 'transform' the status of women for the long term and it did not help change attitudes especially of those in the countryside. The improved status was unbalanced, cities saw improved status but those in the countryside or in outlying mission regions saw lack of change. The status of women was improved but it was not a transformation as it was unbalanced and inconsistent.

This response received 15 marks.

4	13–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Exemplar response E

Chosen question number: Question 3 ☒ Question 4 ☒

Throughout the years 1917-85 the role of the Secret Police was to protect the Communist regime from its opponents, the which highlighted under Stalin in the Great Terror of the 1930s and continued under Brezhnev. This essay will assess the significance in the role of the Secret Police in maintaining Communist control in the years 1917-85 over other factors. We will need to consider Lenin's use of the Cheka in the civil war and Stalin's use of terror in the Purges through the radicalisation of the NKVD, and the role of the Secret Police (KGB) under Brezhnev to suppress dissidents. On the other hand, we will need to ~~consider~~^{assess} how the role of the Secret Police was not significant for maintaining Communist control in the years 1917-85. We will need to consider the use of media and propaganda and control of the economy, in order to determine the ~~relative~~^{relative} significance in the role of the Secret Police. Overall, the essay will favour how the role of the Secret Police was most significant for maintaining control in the years 1917-85, due to the role of

(Section B continued) ^(Context) The NKVD is the Great Terror, which influenced the increased role of the secret police under Brezhnev by 1985.

One reason why the role of the secret police was most significant in maintaining Communist control ^{would be how in} the years 1917-~~1928~~⁵³ ~~the~~ ^{the} use of the Cheka in the Civil War and the radicalisation of the NKVP in the Great Terror under Stalin's purges of the 1930s. This means how in the period 1917-28, Lenin used the Cheka to attack opponents of the regime ^{during} the Civil War, which Central thought the NEP. This included ^{the Cheka} closing down newspapers under the decree of press and attorney by Lenin opponents in government. Moreover, under Stalin, the increased role of the NKVD highlighted in the period of the 1930s to ~~the~~ increase Stalin's control ^(in the Great Terror). This included the Moscow Show trials and attacks against 39,000 Army officers by 1938. Therefore, the secret police was most significant in maintaining Communist control due to how in the period 1917-53 both Stalin and Lenin increased the role of the secret police, especially in the period of the Great Terror in 1938 to increase Stalin's control of the totalitarian state, through purges against its citizens.

(Section B continued)

Furthermore, another reason why the role of the secret police was most significant in maintaining Communist control ~~was the period 1964-85~~ was how in the years 1964-85 Brezhnev ~~ended~~ ended Khrushchev's ~~limitations~~ limitations on the role of the secret police and reintroduced the power of the KGB to control dissidents who undermined the stability of the USSR. This included the discipline of the KGB ^{under Andropov} who carried out missions against well known dissidents, the KGB 'worry system' which issued 70,000 warnings by 1985 and the use of psychiatric treatment to 'silence' dissidents using 'life-long sentences' in mental institutions. Therefore, the role of the secret police was ~~the~~ most significant in maintaining Communist control as in the period 1964-85, the role of the KGB under Andropov attacked dissidents, who undermined the regime which ended Brezhnev's period of stability by 1985.

On the other hand, the role of the secret police was not most significant in maintaining Communist control ~~in the years 1917-85~~ due to other factors, such as control of media and propaganda in the period of 1917-64 under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev, which maintained →

(Section B continued) ~~Continued~~ (Continued →)
 Communist Control over the population of the USSR. This means how Lenin ~~and~~ and Stalin both controlled the media through the decree on press ^(and book rulings under the NEP) which ~~led to a~~ ^{led to a} complete censorship and the abolition of over 4000 newspapers by 1928. Moreover, Stalin used the media and propaganda to maintain control through ~~increasing~~ increasing media censorship of economic affairs under the Glavlit and 're-wrote' history to glorify Stalin's role in the ^{revolution} ~~revolution~~. This created Stalin's 'cult of personality' as the 'vozhd', which allowed the dictator to transform the USSR into a totalitarian state by 1953. Initially, all aspects of Soviet life. Additionally, Khrushchev used both the media and propaganda to return Communist control ~~through~~ through broadcasting the success of his regime, like the space race, which established Khrushchev's 'cult' based on his reforms in the wages, lands scheme ~~and~~ ^{and} industry by 1964. However, Khrushchev's ~~and~~ ^{and} propaganda broke fail as many of his reforms failed, such as the corn campaign and panic decline. Therefore, the role of the secret police was ^{not} ~~not~~ most significant in maintaining Communist control since in the period 1917-64 Soviet leaders used media and propaganda to gain control over people's freedoms, which maintained Communist control by 1964.

(Section B continued)

Additionally, the role of the Secret Police was not most significant in maintaining control ~~until 1985~~ since in the period 1964-85 Khrushchev and Brezhnev's control of the economy maintained control due to the increase of living standards for the economy of Stalin in the 1930s. This meant how both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's reform of the economy to provide on consumer ~~goods~~ production and invest in agriculture led to the USSR to maintain control. The successes included an ~~approx~~ 60 per cent increase in consumer goods and ~~the~~ 35 per cent in GNP ~~which~~ under the long-term land scheme led to ~~higher~~ higher living standards for farmers and Soviet citizens by 1985. Therefore, the role of the Secret Police was not most significant in maintaining control since the ~~reform~~ transformation of the economy under Khrushchev and Brezhnev met their aim to increase the standard of living for Soviet citizens and ~~achieve~~ ^{achieve} high levels of production ~~which was possible~~ ^{overall} by 1985. However, the role of the Secret Police was most significant due to the decline of economic growth ~~by 1985~~ ^{only grew at 2 per cent by 1985} which ~~led to the role of the Secret Police~~ ^{increased the role of the Secret Police} under Brezhnev ~~by 1985~~ ^(KGB) to maintain control ~~over the USSR~~ over the USSR by 1985.

(Section B continued)

In Conclusion, the role of the secret police was most significant in maintaining Communist Control as through the period 1917-85 Soviet leaders ^{consistently} relied on the secret police to silence and attack opposites to the regime, which began by using under Stalin during the first term of the 1930s and returned under Brezhnev, who increased the power of the KGB to attack dissidents, ~~which~~ which stabilised the power of the USSR over its citizens by 1985.

This response received 16 marks.

4	13-16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
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Section C

Question 5

- 5 In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced' (Extract 1, line 9)?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

Exemplar response F

The Collapse of the USSR in 1991 was down to many factors such as the failure of Perestroika to transform the economy to a market economy, the freedom that Glasnost provided was used to attack the party and Gorbachev's dealings with nationalism by being naive towards the problem was arguably down to Gorbachev's over confidence in his reform and the fact he did not consider the fatal consequences that emerged from them. However some may argue that it was underlying problems that led to the collapse such as the fundamental flaws of the command economy itself or the inevitability of the fall of the USSR.

Extract 1, written by Edward Acton and Tom Stableford, argues firstly that reforms such as ~~acceleration, perestroika, and glasnost~~ acceleration, Perestroika, Glasnost and democratisation were all based on Gorbachev being over-confident and resulted in devastating results. Perestroika

while trying to transform the USSR's Command economy into a market economy caused many fundamental problems. When the author speaks of loosening censorship he is referring to Glasnost, meaning openness, which was an attempt made by Gorbachev to allow open discussion about the failings of the party and make alliances with intellectuals and those against party hard liners. Glasnost backfired greatly as open discussion led to open criticism of Stalin, Marxism and the foundation of Communism. Democratisation, as extract 1 argues, further de-stabilised the power of state as in elections within republics communist leaders were replaced with local leaders and democratisation allowed legally Yeltsin to rise in power who was openly anti-communist. These reforms were due to Gorbachev underestimating the consequences that followed and his confidence in them played a role in that. Secondly Extract one argues that one of the major consequences that played a role in the fall of the USSR was a rise in nationalism in the republics as all of Gorbachev's reforms aided the speed at which nationalisation happened.

This response received 5 marks.

2	4-7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
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Exemplar response G

The 'triple reformations' that Gorbachev Made in the last 6 years of Soviet union one in my view the cause for the unions fall with the rise of Boris Yeltsin and Nationalism as additional reasons for why they were such a key faultline that held such large effects. Gorbachev Made reforms in Politics and the economy that left the ground gaps for Nationalism or Boris Yeltsin to crowd through and push the system down.

In the economy it is clear that the effects were present, ^{Extract 1} ~~source~~ touches upon this with its statement of, 'he attempted to accelerate industrial growth' which he did not under this acceleration policy a huge failure emerged. He was dependant on oil prices and when these oil prices dropped from \$50 to \$20 the policy failed. the USSR had to borrow from the west which increased their debts in result. Extract 2 picks up on this by stating 'The Soviet union's wonderful and magnificent ~~economic~~ economic performance'. There is an honest statement by Gorbachev attempted to create a 'Partial Market' but when this failed he pulled out Government subsidies for food, in result general food prices increased with beef going from 2 roubles to 7 roubles and in result an increase in the debt of the USSR once more. Therefore it is clear that the economic changes were a key aspect ~~of the~~ in the fall of the USSR. Showing in result Gorbachev's confidence was truly misplaced.

In politics, Gorbachev was once more too confident, he allowed public election ~~to~~ to occur following his policy of Glasnost. Extract 1 mentions this with 'He radically loosened the rigour of censorship -... introducing competitive ^{elections} ~~elections~~'. This was true Glasnost allowed open criticism of the USSR which benefited the nationalist movements and Boris Yeltsin, his key opponents. Gorbachev was not finished however as he called for elections. The results speak out Gorbachev's failure on their own. 89 % of the population were in favour of Yeltsin and 85 % of the public wanted a democratic Russia in Moscow. In addition multiple nationalist groups were able to rise through the polls. This misplacement in Gorbachev's confidence is clear as Extract 2 summarises, 'This deadly combination of predominantly nationalist pressure and Soviet imperial withdrawal was 'deadly' in reality. Yeltsin had risen so far as Gorbachev's opponents that Gorbachev created titles ~~and~~ for himself which still proved unchallenging to the head of state, Yeltsin. Gorbachev had allowed the party's power to diminish under criticism and nationalism whilst in combination allowed Yeltsin to rise with the state. Therefore in conclusion it was once again Gorbachev's misplaced political confidence that led to his failures.

In conclusion I believe Extract 1 and 2 are beneficial in explaining the misplaced confidence of Gorbachev in his reforms as together when used together they refer on the direct economic and political changes his reforms made whilst also addressing the rise in nationalist nationalism. However it is key to state the importance on Boris Yeltsin's rise when addressing the fall of the Soviet Union as his control with the state emerged superior over the communist party.

This response received 10 marks.

3	8-12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrates understanding of the extracts and shows some analysis by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. A judgement is given and related to some key points of view in the extracts and discussion is attempted, albeit with limited substantiation.
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Exemplar response H

The issue of who is to blame for the collapse of the USSR has been debated by historians for some time, with many drawing in the influence of Gorbachev. As Extract 1 identifies, Gorbachev could be accused of attempting to do too much ~~with~~ at once through the use of risky policies that he believed would ~~have~~ succeed. While this is certainly true, and many of Gorbachev's policies did eventually undermine the Soviet regime, I believe it is more accurate to argue, instead of simply placing blame for the fall on Gorbachev, it is more likely that the fall of the USSR was caused by a number of factors. As Extract 2 ^{argues} ~~implies~~, there were major weaknesses in the Soviet economy that made reform difficult, and both Extract 1 and 2 identify a resurgence of nationalist thought that ~~was~~ weakened the Soviet Union overall.

Extract 1 focuses most of its analysis around the role of Gorbachev and his part for ~~too~~ too much

untested reform all at once. It ~~writes~~ in Action and Starbleford write how he 'tried to 'accelerate industrial growth', and 'dismantle the structures of a command economy' and 'loosened the rigour of censorship' all at the same time, which they imply combined to trigger the fall of the USSR. By doing all of his numerous policies at once. Extract 1 appears to emphasise how Gorbachev attempted too many reforms at once, many of which had a chance of destabilising the USSR. This is certainly true, Gorbachev ~~was~~ has previously been accused of wanting reform without knowing which reform was needed, which in turn led to the implementation of ~~the~~ political and economic policies that ~~lead~~ unintentionally weakened the USSR. An example of this would be his introduction of multi-candidate elections in both Russia and the other republics.

Gorbachev failed to realise how, by ~~implementing~~ implementing these at a point when the economy was also suffering, he risked the people electing people who posed a threat to the USSR, something ~~was~~ we saw happening in the republics with the election of key nationalists and reformers. Gorbachev also failed to realise how his policy of 'Glasnost' ~~was~~ would open himself up to criticism ~~on~~ that changed the way the Soviet people saw the government.

Therefore, this makes it more ~~con~~convincing to argue the fall of the USSR was caused by Gorbachev's blind faith in his policies, and as several had unforeseen consequences on the relationship between central control and the Soviet people that ~~changed~~ undermined the authority of the state.

~~But~~ However, Extract 2 also points to the inherent ~~in the Soviet economy~~ issues in the Soviet economy, ~~that~~ that made reform difficult. Pearson writes how Russia had a 'sprawling, outdated and dysfunctional economy', ~~something which~~ which meant that Gorbachev's reforms came 'too little, too late' to save an economy already in decline. The word 'outdated' can certainly be applied to the economy; it had a history of failing to adopt new technology effectively. Gorbachev had hoped that the encouragement of joint ventures in 1988 would open the USSR up to investment from the West, who would in turn provide much needed new technology. However, just as Pearson identifies, there were issues in the economy from previously that hampered this success. Traditional conservatives preferred strict control over factories and shops, and so many failed to adopt the new technology brought over. In other areas senior politicians restricted success of policies, a ~~key~~ key example of this being in

Leningrad where officials bred the savages provided in an effort to limit the success of 'perestroika'. This all removes some of the blame from Gorbachev and his wishful thinking, as it points to the issues inherent in a command economy like outdated technology and strict control from above that stopped his policies being as successful as they could be. Perestroika may have had more success had officials within the party not worked against it, and in turn helped ^{cause the failure of} ~~test~~ a policy that was needed to rejuvenate the USSR.

Finally, I believe we should consider the importance of nationalism in the USSR, and how a resurgence of nationalist feeling would have undermined Gorbachev's authority. Extract 1 writes how it 'set off an explosion which ripped apart the Soviet system', clearly demonstrating how once nationalist feeling began to grow in popularity, it became hard to hold the USSR together. While this was definitely allowed by Gorbachev, who actively chose to end the Brezhnev Doctrine and then introduce multi-candidate elections that let the republics vote in nationalist governments, who then mitigated a move towards independence that he did little to stop, it cannot be ignored that this nationalist feeling would have very negatively affected the USSR as a whole. ~~Pearson~~ Pearson writes how 'a

'combination of predominantly nationalist pressure and Soviet imperial withdrawal spread east to contaminate the USSR itself', demonstrating how it would have been impossible for the USSR to survive once the republics and Eastern European territories under its control made bids for independence. While some of the blame for this must be placed on Gorbachev, it is easy to see how a nationalist movement could quickly spiral out of control until it was a main factor in the collapse of the USSR.

To conclude, it is quite convincing to argue that it was Gorbachev's naivety that helped lead to the fall of the USSR, as he did mitigate changes and policies that allowed for a resurgence of opposition to communist rule. However, I believe we must also draw in the influence of economic weaknesses and a growth in nationalist feeling that ~~are~~ all ~~contributed~~ contributed to the eventual collapse.

This response received 18 marks.

5	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.
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Exemplar response I

The collapse of the USSR can be attributed to a variety of factors including the economic strategy, political system, ~~and the~~ foreign policy and Gorbachev himself. All these factors have a key role to play in the collapse of the USSR as they can all be linked to each in some way. However, some factors can be considered more responsible and had a greater effect than others meaning some factors can be considered more important for the collapse of the USSR.

The first factor which can be considered for the collapse of the USSR is Gorbachev himself and the confidence he had in his system. Gorbachev was credited in most factors which created the collapse and so is a key figure. Extract 1 believes that the collapse of the USSR is mostly due to Gorbachev as he was the one who created the issues in the different factors such as the economy, political and foreign policy. Extract 1 can be seen believing Gorbachev is the main fault for the collapse as the main blame he put on a range of different factors. 'He changed the USSR foreign policy' this was a key decision which was made by Gorbachev as he ended the Brezhnev Doctrine and told the satellite states to rid their

an path of socialism. This was done as Gorbachev felt it was keeping the economy to much, costing £ \$40 billion a year, and he did not want to use force to keep the countries part of the USSR leading to the dismantlement of the Satellite States. The Extract 1 then goes on to blame Gorbachev for the economic issues. 'He... ~~disrupted~~ dismantle many of the structures of the command economy'. Gorbachev can be seen as having a lack of vision when trying to fix the economy as he knew there was an issue but was unable to resolve it leading to a series of trial and error methods causing the situation to be worse and as Extract 1 says 'turning stagnation into steep decline'. Extract 1 then also goes on to blame Gorbachev for large amount of opposition which occurred. 'He radically loosened the reins of censorship and the scope of protesting'. Gorbachev felt that the government was old and had a lack of innovation and so set up Glasnost (openness) to try and change this. However, Stalin's purges, housing issues and the longed impact of the Arab Sea came to light and created opposition. The opposition became so great that by 1989 there were 60,000 informal political groups formed.

Although Extract 1 puts a lot of blame on Gorbachev for the collapse of the USSR, Gorbachev was not trying to do this. Historians Sony believe that it was Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform, democratisation and the deal decolonising of the Baltic states all at the same time which was the real issue as it was too much for the USSR to handle.

Gorbachev can be seen as a key reason for the collapse of the USSR as highlighted by Extract 1, however, Extract 2 believes the collapse of the USSR is to do with other factors such as the economy. Extract 2 describes the USSR's economy as 'inefficient and costed'. This can be seen with the effects of the 12th Five-Year Plan in which Gorbachev wanted to focus on investment and improving Scientific technology. To do this the USSR's deficit rose from 2.4% in 1986 to 6.2% by 1987, the investment led however not paid off as the USSR's economy was in a worse state than previously. Extract 2 also thinks that policies such as Perestroika were 'too little too late'. Although this may be true the short amount of time which the policies were in place were not very successful as most of the policies created issues. This is highlighted by policy such as the Joint venture in Jan 1987 which tried to encourage foreign businesses to set up so the USSR could have more up to date technology. The policy brought in 3000 businesses but they were all small and so did not bring any advantages to the economy. Another policy which created issues was the legalisation of co-operatives in 1988. This was meant small private shops could set their own prices. This however, resulted in inflation and so meant rationing had to be reintroduced because it created such great issues. This shows that although economic policies may have come late they were not very successful and so meant that the Soviet

Union was lost in the 'By 1990, general bankruptcy'.

Although both sources have their views on why the USSR collapsed neither really go into any detail about any other key factors. Another key factor was the nationalisation of the Satellite and the Baltic States. This occurred once the Brezhnev Doctrine had ended. In 1989 Poland were the first state to vote for a non-communist government and once no action was taken by the USSR this acted as a catalyst for the other countries to have confidence in following. This caused the rapid destruction of the satellite states and ~~many~~ inspired ones such as the Baltic States to try and gain independence. Countries such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were all countries before the creation of the USSR and so have their own language, traditions and history. In 1988 these countries set up National Fronts and by the end of 1990 were claiming independence. ~~which~~ All this left the USSR a lot weaker and meant they had a lot less support which help lead to the eventual collapse of the USSR in 1991.

Another key factor which goes unmentioned in the Extract is the impact which Yeltsin¹⁹⁸⁹ is undermining Gorbachev and becoming the leader in 1991. Once Yeltsin was elected from the government in Feb 1989 he started to gain lots of support and began to rival Gorbachev. He would attend many protests to gain support and in Moscow 1989 he was

leading a protest with over 200,000 people. Once Khrushchev was elected to the Premier Commission by securing 89% of votes, it gave him a base to attack Gorbachev and undermine him. Once the situation of the August Coup occurred Khrushchev could act as the hero of the situation and he was able to end the Union Treaty. He could create the treaty of commonwealth states of independent states by 1999 (the end of 1991).

Overall I do think that the collapse of the USSR can be attributed mostly to Gorbachev and his reforms as he was involved heavily in most of the different and even acted as a catalyst for the issues that occurred in those sectors e.g. politically created glasnost and by 1989 60,000 original political groups were formed. Overall the main different sectors: economy, political groups and nationalisation of satellite and Baltic states. I don't think on their own could have resulted in the USSR collapsing but because Gorbachev attempted to solve these issues all at the same time the USSR could not handle it and so collapsed.

This response received 15 marks.

4	13-16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by comparison of them. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge to discuss the views. Most of the relevant aspects of the debate will be discussed, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. • Discusses evidence provided in the extracts in order to reach a supported overall judgement. Discussion of points of view in the extracts demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.
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Exemplar response J

Ever since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, there has been much debate about what the key factors were in causing the decline of this state. The interpretation that the USSR collapsed because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced' is supported by extract one, which attributes Gorbachev's policies to causing the collapse of the Soviet Union because they undermined his power base. Alternatively, extract two suggests that it was the simultaneous failure of Gorbachev's policies and nationalism that caused the collapse of the USSR. However, perhaps these two interpretations can be reconciled.

The ~~an~~ interpretation that Gorbachev's

policies caused the collapse of the Soviet Union because they undermined his power base can find support in both extracts one and two. Acton and Stableford argue that Gorbachev's political reforms undermined his power base, as they 'radically loosened the rigour of censorship and the scope for questioning the certainties of Marxism-Leninism'. This refers to how Gorbachev's policy of glasnost allowed writers and intellectuals to openly criticise the Party: Gorbachev introduced this policy in the hope that it would discredit conservative elements of the Party, who stood against his more radical policies. In actuality, Glasnost discredited the entire Soviet regime: for example, environmental groups published information to show how a government irrigation scheme which used water diverted from the Aral Sea had led to the drying up of this body of water, and negative climate change for the surrounding region.

While this caused people to question the authority of the Communist Party, Gorbachev's simultaneous economic policies led to economic chaos, as Gorbachev 'began to dismantle the structures of the command economy' (extract 1), while also trying to retain aspects of the 'sprawling, outdated and dysfunctional economy' (extract 2). For example, in 1988, Gorbachev legalised co-operatives, stimulating a market economy, but did not abolish Gosplan, the state planning apparatus for the economy until 1990. Thus, both extract 1 and 2 can be well supported in their interpretations that Gorbachev's ~~failure~~ failed economic and political policies undermined his power base, as they showed the weaknesses of the Party and exacerbated economic decline.

On the other hand, Pearson centres the idea that the most important factor in causing the decline of the USSR was Gorbachev's failed policies.

by arguing that it was instead the context in which Gorbachev's reforms occurred in; namely, that ~~they~~ ~~seem~~ 'nationalist pressure' and 'Soviet imperial withdrawal' occurred simultaneously. Pearson's concept of 'Soviet imperial withdrawal' refers to how Gorbachev introduced policies which lessened the Party's control over nationalist republics; as extract 1 notes, Gorbachev introduced 'competitive elections'. This refers to how Gorbachev's policy of Democratisation entailed allowing genuine elections: for example, in March 1989, there were the multi-candidate elections for the Congress of People's Deputies. This directly led to the rise of nationalism, as Yeltsin won 89% of the vote in this election. When he resigned from the Communist Party in July 1990, this firmly set the Russian Congress as an alternative power base to the Soviet government. This was further exacerbated when Gorbachev repealed article 6, which secured the

dominance of the Communist Party. After this, Yeltsin announced the sovereignty of the Russian Congress over Soviet laws: this culminated in the series of events which led to Gorbachev no longer having a Soviet Union to be president of by December 1991. Thus, while extract 2 challenges extract 1 to suggest that greater importance needs to be placed on how Gorbachev's political policies caused 'Soviet imperial withdrawal' which directly allowed for the rise of nationalist groups, which eventually overthrew the Soviet Union.

However, it could be argued that, despite ostensible differences, the arguments of extract 1 and 2 can very easily be reconciled by suggesting that, instead of the collapse of the USSR being the result of the simultaneous issues of a 'nationalist pressure' and 'Soviet withdrawal' (extract 2), Gorbachev's policies directly

led to the rise of nationalism in the USSR. Thus, the argument that the USSR collapsed because of Gorbachev's failed reforms is essentially correct. While extract 2 argues that Gorbachev's policies entailed 'Soviet imperial withdrawal', it ~~was~~ fails to acknowledge how ~~the~~ Gorbachev's policies also directly led to nationalist discontent by attempting to increase control in localities. For example, Gorbachev's policy of cadre change to remove the corruption of local officials under Brezhnev entailed the removal of national First Secretaries and replacement with Russian officials. For example, in Kazakhstan, Kolbin replaced Kunder as First Secretary of the local Soviet, leading to nationalist rebellion against the Soviet state. Extract 2 also references how the Soviet Empire could no longer 'deliver the welfare state by fulfilling the economic and social expectations of its population'. This refers to how

Gorbachev's failed economic policies meant that he could no longer uphold the government's side of the 'social contract' implemented by Brezhnev in the Soviet Constitution of 1977.

As a result, nationalist groups no longer had to remain loyal to the state, and so could rebel against it. This interpretation counters Pearson's key argument to show that it was not just the simultaneous contexts of Gorbachev's policies and nationalist discontent that led to the collapse of the USSR, but rather Gorbachev's policies directly led to the rise of nationalist discontent, which eventually caused the collapse of the USSR. Thus, it also extends Acton and Stableford's interpretation to suggest that the USSR collapsed, not just as a result of Gorbachev's failed policies, but how these policies directly allowed for the growth of nationalism - the final straw in causing the collapse of the Soviet state.

In conclusion, the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because Gorbachev's confidence in his reform policies 'proved gravely misplaced' can be well supported. Both extract 1 and 2 are essentially shades of this same interpretation; however, while extract 1 puts a greater focus on Gorbachev's failed policies, extract 2 puts a greater focus on the growth of nationalism. The most convincing interpretation arises out of a combination of these two arguments: the USSR fell as a result of how Gorbachev's policies directly allowed for the growth of nationalism. Thus, while Gorbachev's policies already significantly undermined his power base, nationalism was the final straw that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of Yeltsin as the new President of Russia.

This response received 20 marks.

5	17-20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • Presents sustained evaluative argument, reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.
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